

EXHIBIT 5

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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IN RE: TERRORIST ATTACKS ON :
SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 : 03 MDL 1570 (GBD) (SN)

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*** THIS TRANSCRIPT CONTAINS CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL ***

Deposition of EMILE A. NAKHLEH, Ph.D.

Conducted Remotely

Wednesday, June 15, 2022

9:03 a.m.

Reported by: Matthew Goldstein, RMR, CRR

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1 A. It's something that I cannot really talk
2 about except to say that even though I was
3 primarily an analyst, my other functions included
4 going out to the field at the request of the chief
5 of station and senior case officers. And I
6 managed a migrant academic outreach program at the
7 agency which I created and was praised even by the
8 president and continues to be to this very day.

9 So some of my trips overseas, some of
10 them were analytic analysis trips, and some of
11 them working with people and assessing people
12 to -- for DEO to determine the type of
13 relationship that the U.S. Government would be
14 interested in having with a particular person
15 without going into details. So that's the most I
16 can talk about that.

17 Q. Sir, did you conduct any clandestine
18 work?

19 A. I said I went outside on some trips to
20 dealing with operations. I cannot really talk
21 about that.

22 Q. Can you say yes or no whether you worked

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1 in a clandestine capacity?

2 A. I answered that question. Some of my
3 trips involved this type of work but I cannot
4 continue to discuss this issue and I hope you
5 understand.

6 Q. That's fine. I'm just asking for your
7 background.

8 Did you ever handle clandestine agents?

9 A. I talked to and judged and ruled and
10 made recommendations on potential and current
11 agents. I cannot go beyond that. And I hope you
12 do not push this line of questioning because I
13 will not be able to answer these questions.

14 Q. At the CIA, did you work on issues
15 relating to Saudi Arabia and Al-Qaeda?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Sir, as part of your work at the CIA,
18 you're aware of the long history of cooperation
19 between Saudi Arabia and the United States;
20 correct?

21 A. State to state, yes.

22 Q. You're certainly aware that the CIA

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1 supported the mujahideen in Afghanistan during the
2 Soviet invasion?

3 A. Yes, that was U.S. policy at the time.

4 And --

5 Q. And your --

6 A. And we supported that because -- in
7 fact, most Muslim countries supported that. The
8 Muslim World League issued a fatwa in support of
9 that, and the United States was involved in that.
10 And so I am, of course, aware of that.

11 Q. And you're aware, sir, that Saudi Arabia
12 matched U.S. contributions dollar for dollar, and
13 that amount was put in a CIA-controlled bank
14 account?

15 A. They were heavily involved in that,
16 financially and ideologically at the time.

17 Q. And the CIA and Saudi Arabia jointly
18 supported the mujahideen fighters; correct?

19 A. That is correct, and many other
20 countries. Most Muslim countries supported the
21 mujahideen in Afghanistan in the '80s against the
22 Soviet Union.

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1 Q. And those mujahideen fighters, they had
2 declared jihad against the Soviets, and they
3 justified their resistance to the Soviets in
4 religious terms; correct?

5 MR. SIMPSON: Objection to form.

6 BY MR. SHEN:

7 Q. You can answer.

8 A. So your question -- can you repeat the
9 question, please?

10 Q. Sure.

11 The mujahideen fighters had declared
12 jihad against the Soviets and justified their
13 resistance in religious terms; correct?

14 A. Yes, for the most part. Not
15 necessarily --

16 Q. And the CIA supported --

17 A. Not necessarily the foot soldiers,
18 right, but the higher-ups, of course, they use the
19 religious argument that -- to justify jihad
20 against a perceived enemy of Islam -- an infidel
21 enemy of Islam that was attacking and invading a
22 Muslim country. This is generally a justification

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1 professors, graduate students, and others.

2 BY MR. SHEN:

3 Q. And I promise you, sir, we will get to
4 that. If you could focus on my question and just
5 answer my question, please.

6 Now, sir, in 1992 and 1993, Usama bin
7 Ladin was in Sudan; is that correct?

8 A. That is correct.

9 Q. And the Saudi government instructed him
10 to stop his criticisms of the royal family;
11 correct?

12 MR. SIMPSON: Objection to form.

13 THE WITNESS: Yes, that is correct. Of
14 course --

15 BY MR. SHEN:

16 Q. And they informed him that if they did
17 not, legal action would be taken against him.
18 That's correct; right?

19 A. I'm sorry, the question was that they
20 did not --

21 Q. The Saudi government informed Usama bin
22 Ladin in '92 and '93 if he didn't stop his

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1 criticism, legal action would be taken against
2 him; correct?

3 A. Yes, that they had threatened to take
4 away his passport and freeze the money he was
5 getting from the bin Ladin foundation and family
6 and business. So they did threaten to stop -- to
7 take action against him.

8 Q. And they ultimately did that. They
9 froze his assets, and they stripped him of
10 citizenship; correct?

11 A. That is correct.

12 Q. Now, in 1994, are you aware that the
13 Sudanese government accused Saudi Arabia of
14 attempting to assassinate Usama bin Ladin?

15 A. I recall that, yes.

16 Q. And we discussed about in 1994, Saudi
17 Arabia stripped Usama bin Ladin of his
18 citizenship. Through the next seven years,
19 through 2000 -- in the 2001 attacks, bin Ladin
20 continued to issue public statements where he
21 criticized the royal family, in fact, called for
22 the royal family's removal from power; correct?

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1 MR. SIMPSON: Objection to form.

2 Can you simplify the question, please?

3 MR. SHEN: No, I can't, Gavin.

4 THE WITNESS: What is the question,
5 please?

6 BY MR. SHEN:

7 Q. The question is: Through the next
8 seven years, from '94 through 2001, Usama bin
9 Ladin continued to criticize the Saudi royal
10 family and Saudi government and called for the
11 king's removal from power; correct?

12 A. Yes, at one -- at certain times, was
13 more vocal than others, because by that time Usama
14 bin Ladin and other jihadist groups developed this
15 notion that originally was developed by Sayyid
16 Qutb about the near enemy and the far enemy.

17 Initially, the far enemy was the United States, if
18 you were the Christian crusaders headed by the
19 United States and Zionism is headed by Israel.

20 But what Sayyid Qutb developed in his
21 book, Signposts, which was accepted by many
22 jihadists in Saudi Arabia, that the near enemy

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1 consisted of Muslim leaders whose behavior in
2 their view was un-Islamic.

3 And so when a Muslim leader, he
4 argued -- or they argued, becomes un-Islamic in
5 their behavior, then that Muslim leader in their
6 view becomes an apostate and, therefore, would be
7 justifiable -- his killing would be justified.

8 Q. And that's the position that Usama bin
9 Ladin took with respect to the king of Saudi
10 Arabia; correct?

11 A. Not only the king of Saudi Arabia, but
12 other Muslim leaders who in his view were
13 un-Islamic in their behavior, like Musharraf of
14 Pakistan or Mubarak of Egypt or -- excuse me --
15 Abdullah of Jordan and so on. So not only --

16 Q. So certainly the Saudi government fell
17 in that category?

18 A. Sorry. Not only the king of Saudi
19 Arabia, but other Islamic leaders who in their
20 view were un-Islamic and, therefore, constituted
21 what they called the near enemy.

22 Q. Sir, you're aware that in April of 1996,

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1 Saudi Arabia attempted to extradite bin Ladin from
2 Sudan to face charges in Saudi Arabia?

3 MR. SIMPSON: Objection to form.

4 THE WITNESS: I am aware at that time,
5 we were all aware of this ongoing relationship
6 between Usama bin Ladin and Saudi Arabia. They
7 did try to extradite him, and there was conflict
8 with Sudan, as well.

9 BY MR. SHEN:

10 Q. And you're aware that the 9/11
11 commission implicated Al-Qaeda in a plot in
12 January 1998 to smuggle missiles into Saudi
13 Arabia; correct?

14 A. That is correct.

15 Q. And in June of '98, Saudi Arabia with
16 U.S. support, including the support of George
17 Tenet, the head of the CIA, attempted to extradite
18 bin Ladin from Afghanistan?

19 A. I am not going to comment on the role
20 George Tenet.

21 Q. But you are aware that Saudi Arabia
22 attempted to extradite bin Ladin from Afghanistan?

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1 A. Yes.

2 Q. And you're aware that Prince Turki made
3 that trip?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. You're aware that he was accompanied by
6 the former minister of Islamic Affairs, Sheikh
7 Abdullah al-Turki?

8 A. The question, please?

9 Q. The question was: Prince Turki was
10 unaccompanied by the former minister of Islamic
11 Affairs, Sheikh Abdullah al-Turki?

12 A. I recall I was aware of that story at
13 the time. I do not recall the details at this
14 moment.

15 Q. And you're aware that the Taliban
16 refused Saudi Arabia's request; correct?

17 A. Sudan you said?

18 Q. Taliban. The Taliban refused --

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. -- Saudi Arabia's request?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. And when the Taliban refused the

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1 request, Saudi Arabia, in fact, cut off all
2 diplomatic relations with the Taliban; correct?

3 A. I recall that was the case, yeah.

4 Q. And shortly after that when bin Ladin
5 was in Afghanistan, there was an assassination
6 attempt on him. Are you aware that bin Ladin's
7 former bodyguard claimed that Saudi Arabia was
8 behind that assassination attempt?

9 MR. SIMPSON: Objection to form.

10 THE WITNESS: There were statements
11 about that at the time, yes.

12 BY MR. SHEN:

13 Q. So before the 9/11 attacks, there was a
14 long and intense history of hostility between
15 Saudi Arabia and Usama bin Ladin; correct?

16 MR. SIMPSON: Objection to form.

17 THE WITNESS: There was, because that
18 relationship had deteriorated from the early
19 '90's, that is the previous decade, between him
20 and Saudi Arabia and the monarchy. So, yes, that
21 would have been the case.

22

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1 BY MR. SHEN:

2 Q. And by the late 1990s, Saudi Arabia
3 certainly understood that Al-Qaeda was a threat;
4 correct?

5 A. Well, not to the kingdom itself. That
6 is a question that there was a lot of debate about
7 that in the U.S. government. We did not believe
8 at CIA at the time that the Saudi monarchy really
9 appreciated the threat that Al-Qaeda -- and not
10 only Al-Qaeda but other jihadist groups posed to
11 Saudi Arabia. We got the impression at the time
12 that as long as jihad was conducted away from
13 Saudi Arabia, the Saudi leadership was not
14 terribly concerned about a threat to Saudi Arabia
15 itself.

16 And that was the point that we tried to
17 make to the Saudi leadership at the time before
18 2001, 2002, that jihad that goes on overseas
19 doesn't stay overseas. That ultimately it comes
20 home by those people, jihadists, who did jihad in
21 Afghanistan or Chechnya or Bosnia, ultimately it
22 comes home.

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1 BY MR. SHEN:

2 Q. Sir, did you write every word in your
3 expert report?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. And, sir, you write in your expert
6 report that by the late 1990s, the kingdom came to
7 understand that Usama bin Ladin and Al-Qaeda was a
8 threat. Those are your words; correct?

9 A. Yes, that was a threat to the monarchy,
10 but not necessarily to Saudi Arabia. There is a
11 distinction between the two; that is, we were
12 arguing that ultimately Saudi Arabia were the
13 subject to the start of jihadist activity and
14 the -- for state-to-state reasons, for national
15 interest reasons, the monarchy made decisions that
16 did not necessarily give us the impression that
17 they really appreciated the threat to Saudi Arabia
18 as a country.

19 Q. Sir, the monarchy, the Saudi royal
20 family, the al-Sauds, they run the Saudi
21 government; correct?

22 A. Yes, they do.

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1 Q. And the al-Saudis, the Saudi royal
2 family, the monarchy, realized in the late 1990s,
3 as you write in your report, that Al-Qaeda was a
4 threat; correct?

5 MR. SIMPSON: Objection. Objection to
6 form.

7 THE WITNESS: Yes. I mean, there -- it
8 was a threat to the monarchy when they had not
9 focused on the threat as being more pervasive than
10 it was. We tried to argue with them that the
11 threat was more pervasive not only to Saudi
12 Arabia, but to other countries in the region.

13 BY MR. SHEN:

14 Q. Now, sir, when you were working at the
15 CIA, the CIA actually concluded that Al-Qaeda was
16 a threat to Saudi Arabia and the monarchy;
17 correct?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. And, sir, if we could take a look --

20 MR. SHEN: Please pull up Tab 1. We'll
21 mark this as Sageman 1 -- I'm sorry, we'll mark
22 this as Nakhleh 1.

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1 (Nakhleh Deposition Exhibit 1 was marked
2 for identification and attached to the
3 transcript.)

4 BY MR. SHEN:

5 Q. Sir, you've reviewed this document
6 before; right?

7 A. Let me see.

8 Q. For the record, this is
9 EO14040-3414-UPDATED-MDL. It's a Joint Assessment
10 of Saudi Arabian Support of Terrorism in the
11 Counterintelligence Threat to the United States,
12 December 2004, issued by the CIA and FBI.

13 You've seen this before; right?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. If we could turn please to 3417. And
16 we'll look at the second -- sir, the second full
17 paragraph. It says, "The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
18 fears Al-Qaeda and has for years viewed the
19 organization as a threat to security and survival
20 of the Al Sauds."

21 Do you see that?

22 A. Yes.

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1 is more wider spectrum. They allow for reasoning.
2 They allow for intelligent analysis of the text
3 and of the hadiths. So the difference here, if
4 you are -- if that is really the gist of your
5 question, the difference is that in -- is in the
6 interpretation of each surah or Ayah, that is a
7 chapter or verse in the Quran.

8 And that's where you see if you pick up
9 two Qurans, for example, one published in Saudi
10 Arabia by the King Fahd Publishing Service and one
11 is published by Al-Azhar University in Cairo,
12 which is the oldest Islamic school in the world,
13 you will see the interpretations around each surah
14 or Ayah are different.

15 And so not about the words themselves,
16 but the interpretation of what a particular Ayah
17 or verse means. So the different schools take
18 different views about these schools. The oneness
19 that you referred to specifically refers to the
20 Salafi Wahhabi school of jurisprudence, which is
21 based on the Hanbalis.

22 MR. SHEN: Can we please pull up

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1 Exhibit 10. This will be Nakhleh Exhibit No. 5.

2 (Nakhleh Deposition Exhibit 5 was marked
3 for identification and attached to the
4 transcript.)

5 BY MR. SHEN:

6 Q. And, sir --

7 A. Where --

8 Q. You don't have the document in front of
9 you, sir.

10 Have you reviewed the works of Alexander
11 Meleagrou-Hitchens?

12 A. No. I'm familiar with that book and of
13 his expertise of Hanbali.

14 Q. Are you aware, sir, that this individual
15 has been put forth as a purported expert in this
16 case by plaintiffs?

17 A. Yes. I heard that, yes.

18 Q. Let's look please at page 48 of his
19 book.

20 MR. SHEN: Technician, this is the third
21 page of the document.

22

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1 BY MR. SHEN:

2 Q. And, sir, Mr. Meleagrou-Hitchens writes
3 about the Salafi spectrum. Do you see that?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. And, sir, he writes, if we look at the
6 bottom paragraph on page 48, "The theology of
7 Salafism is rooted in the works of Ibn
8 Taymiyya..."and "According to Ibn Taymiyya, Salafi
9 beliefs are based on literal interpretation of the
10 primary Islamic text that attempts to understand
11 the physical aspects of God himself."

12 Do you see that?

13 A. Correct.

14 Q. And you would certainly agree with that;
15 correct?

16 A. I would have to read it again, if you
17 don't mind. Okay. "According to the Taymiyya,
18 Salafi beliefs are based on a literal
19 interpretation of the primary Islamic text that
20 attempts to understand the physical aspects of God
21 himself." Yes. So --

22 Q. Let's look at page 50, please.

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1 A. Page 50.

2 MR. SHEN: Technician.

3 BY MR. SHEN:

4 Q. Sir, there is a statement at the bottom
5 of page 50 that says, "While all Salafis (Wahhabis
6 included) share the same basic creed which
7 revolves around the centrality of Tawhid, they
8 differ in the methodology they pursue for its
9 implementation and the form their proselytizing
10 (Da'wah) should take."

11 Do you see those statement?

12 A. Yes, all Salafis, that is Wahhabis
13 included, share the same basic creed, which
14 revolves around the centrality of Tawhid. They
15 differ in the methodology, that is the Manhaj,
16 they pursue for its implementation and the form
17 their proselytizing or Da'wah should take. Yes.

18 Q. And you certainly agree with that;
19 correct?

20 A. Yes, that makes sense, but you really
21 also have to take it in the context of other
22 schools. You have to examine, for example, the

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1 footnote he used here. I would look -- basically,
2 it's not like I disagree with this statement, but
3 I would like to look at further materials.

4 Q. And, sir, he goes on to write that
5 Salafism in Western academic literature has
6 traditionally been categorized into three strands:
7 Purists, also known as quietists; politicos, also
8 known as activists or haraki, Salafis; and
9 jihadis.

10 Do you see that statement?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. And you're familiar with the vast amount
13 of literature which has characterized Hanbali
14 Salafis into those three categories; correct?

15 A. Yes, and sometimes interpretations or
16 sub-interpretations of these strands. So this
17 academically is correct; but in reality, there are
18 usually other strands depending on the
19 particularity of the researcher and the context in
20 which the researcher is focusing on.

21 Q. And you yourself have actually used
22 these same categories in describing the strains of

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1 Hanbali Salafism; correct?

2 A. I have used those in my writings to a
3 large extent in the government, within the
4 government.

5 Q. And you've also written about it outside
6 the government. You wrote a piece called "The
7 Necessary Engagement: Reinventing America's
8 Relations with the Muslim World" where you wrote
9 about that; correct?

10 A. Yes, this was my book.

11 MR. SHEN: Can we look at Exhibit 9,
12 please. This will be Nakhleh 6.

13 (Nakhleh Deposition Exhibit 6 was marked
14 for identification and attached to the
15 transcript.)

16 BY MR. SHEN:

17 Q. You recognize this book, sir?

18 A. I don't see the page.

19 Q. Well, I'm just asking, you see the cover
20 page? This is your book?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. If we could look at page 112.

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1 And, sir, under "Traditionalists and
2 Radical Salafis," you write about
3 "Traditionalists, primarily Sunni Muslims, might
4 be divided into three groups: Those who read the
5 Quran and the hadith (Muhammad sayings) literally
6 and who espouse a narrow interpretation of the
7 religion and an exclusivist vision, believe Islam
8 is the only route to salvation, but do not
9 participate in violence or terrorism."

10 Do you see that?

11 A. Yes, I see that.

12 Q. And that's the first group which are
13 quietists; correct?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. And then you describe a second group
16 under that. You say, "those who hold the same
17 narrow interpretations of Islam but view violent
18 jihad as acceptable means for political change in
19 bringing about a global Islamic state or a
20 caliphate."

21 Do you see that?

22 A. Let me see. "Those who hold the same

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1 narrow interpretation of Islam but view violent
2 jihad as an acceptable means for political change
3 and for bringing about a global Islamic state or
4 caliphate," yes.

5 Q. And those are known in the academic
6 literature as activists or political Salafists;
7 correct?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. And then you describe --

10 A. Generally speaking, yes.

11 Q. And then you describe the third group,
12 which you call jihadi Salafists; correct?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. And those individuals are prone to
15 violence and support terrorism in global jihad;
16 correct?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Now, you go on to describe the
19 differences between these groups of Hanbali
20 Salafists. Look at page 113. You say the first
21 group tends to read the scripture literally
22 without any deviation. And then you describe that

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1 group of quietists as essentially the same as
2 fundamentalists, Christians and Jews, who do not
3 engage or support violent jihad; correct?

4 A. That is correct.

5 Q. All right. And so there is a strict
6 division or an actual recognized division between
7 quietists, Hanbali Salafists, and political
8 Salafists and violent global jihadists; correct?

9 MR. SIMPSON: Objection to form.

10 THE WITNESS: That there is a strict
11 division you said? I did not --

12 BY MR. SHEN:

13 Q. Let me ask the question before.

14 Academics, including individuals whose
15 works you cite in your report and as you yourself
16 acknowledge, there is a spectrum of Hanbali
17 Salafists' beliefs between these three categories;
18 correct?

19 A. Yes. Generally that is the case, yes.

20 Q. And, sir, as you've also written, Saudi
21 Arabia as a government has taken actions against
22 individuals who fall in the political or activists

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1 Salafist groups as well as those who fall in the
2 violent jihadist Salafist groups; correct?

3 A. Where is that -- which page is that
4 statement?

5 Q. Let's look at 117, sir.

6 You say, "Several radical clerics have
7 been frequently arrested in Saudi Arabia for their
8 views and moral and financial support of violent
9 jihad and Al-Qaeda."

10 Do you see that?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. And so the government of Saudi Arabia
13 itself has taken actions against that category of
14 Hanbali Salafists; correct?

15 A. Now, I just want to remind you that this
16 book was written after 9/11, and many of the
17 actions that were taken by Saudi Arabia that I
18 referred to in this book were after 9/11,
19 generally speaking.

20 Q. And certainly Saudi Arabia has taken
21 actions against political and activist Salafists
22 and jihadi Salafists prior to 9/11; correct?

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1 MR. SIMPSON: Objection to form.

2 THE WITNESS: So you said they are taken
3 action against -- you mentioned I think two
4 groups; did you?

5 BY MR. SHEN:

6 Q. Activist Salafis, political Salafis,
7 that's one group, and the second group is jihadi
8 Salafis. Saudi Arabia as a government has taken
9 actions against both of those groups prior to
10 9/11?

11 A. Prior or post?

12 Q. Prior.

13 A. I'm not as sure about prior as I am
14 post.

15 Q. Sir, you are aware that Saudi Arabia as
16 a country had a massive crackdown against the
17 Sahwa movement, which were activists and political
18 Salafists; correct?

19 A. Well, now, if you are talking about the
20 Sahwa movement, the Islamic Awakening Movement,
21 that requires a whole long discussion. In fact,
22 the Sahwa started first with what we call -- just

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1 warranted the waging of jihad in response."

2 Do you see that language?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. And then in paragraph 130, you write,
5 "At this juncture it is apt to reflect that there
6 was a marked and unprecedented convergence of
7 views between bin Ladin and the Saudi religious
8 authorities, including many ulama regarding the
9 waging of jihad against the United States."

10 Do you see that?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. And, sir, Ibn Baz who was the Grand
13 Mufti at the time, he certainly did not believe in
14 waging jihad against the United States; correct?

15 MR. SIMPSON: Objection to form.

16 THE WITNESS: I was not talking about
17 Ibn Baz in this paragraph.

18 BY MR. SHEN:

19 Q. All right. And, sir, the council of
20 ministers, they were not in favor of waging jihad
21 against the United States?

22 A. I am not talking about the council of

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1 ministers in this paragraph. You referred me to
2 paragraph 130; correct?

3 Q. And, sir, I'm asking the question. Sir,
4 if you could just answer the questions that I'm
5 asking.

6 The religious council, which was
7 appointed by the king, they didn't believe in
8 waging jihad against the United States; correct?

9 A. Sir, you referred me to 130. Are we
10 still on 130, paragraph 130, in my report?

11 Q. Yes, I'm asking you a separate question,
12 whether the religious council appointed by the
13 king was in favor of waging jihad against the
14 United States?

15 A. So that has nothing to do with 130.

16 Q. Sure. Answer the question, please.

17 A. So the question is what, sir?

18 Q. The religious council appointed by the
19 king, were they in favor of waging jihad against
20 the United States?

21 A. I don't necessarily have an opinion on
22 that council. I am sure based on the experience

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1 is that the head of the council certainly will
2 have to be extremely loyal to the king and,
3 therefore, they would not disagree with state
4 policy as represented by the king.

5 Q. And the state policy, as represented by
6 the king, is of course against waging jihad
7 against the United States; correct?

8 MR. SIMPSON: Counsel, sorry, the
9 witness has indicated that he needs a restroom
10 break and just have to go off the record very
11 briefly so that he can --

12 MR. SHEN: Okay. Can we just answer the
13 pending question, please?

14 MR. SIMPSON: Apologies, yes, I didn't
15 mean to interrupt a pending question. Go ahead
16 with the question again, sorry.

17 BY MR. SHEN:

18 Q. Sir, the state policy as represented by
19 the king is of course against waging jihad against
20 the United States?

21 A. As the king annunciates that. But the
22 question is if some elements within the Minister

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1 of Islamic Affairs, which is a part of the
2 government, makes -- supports violent jihad, does
3 that mean that the whole government -- it means,
4 as I said earlier, that elements within the
5 government in the Minister of Islamic Affairs were
6 supportive of violent jihad because they agreed
7 that the presence of infidel troops was a major
8 insult to Islam and to Saudi Arabia.

9 Q. And if any element in the Ministry of
10 Islamic Affairs, in fact, supported violent jihad,
11 that would go against state policy; correct?

12 MR. SIMPSON: Objection to form.

13 THE WITNESS: I do not know. They'll
14 have to decide that and whether they want to stay
15 in the ministry or not. That is their decision
16 really.

17 BY MR. SHEN:

18 Q. It would certainly go against state
19 policy as annunciated by the king, by the Grand
20 Mufti, and by the religious council; correct?

21 MR. SIMPSON: Objection to form.

22 THE WITNESS: I did not write about that





SUBJECT TO FBI & MDL PROTECTIVE ORDERS**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK**

In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001 03 MDL 1570 (GBD) (SN)

This document relates to

All Actions

**ERRATA SHEET FOR THE DEPOSITION OF
DR. EMILE A. NAKHLEH (JUNE 15, 2022)**

Page and Line ref (Page:Line)	Current text	Revised text	Reason(s)
58:7	khadim	Hami	Transcription error
128:6	revealed by that	revealed by God	Transcription error
152:7	Wahhabiist	Wahhabist	Transcription error
156:9	The Minister	The Ministry	Transcription error
157:12	a tier example	a clear example	Transcription error
157:15	Hadla	Hadlaq	Name correction
157:18	imam of the King Fahad	imam of the King Fahad Mosque	Transcription error / missing word
162:7			Name correction
163:3	visitors coming in	visitors were coming in	Transcription error / missing word
163:9	pr	or	Transcription error
168:15-16	about 	about 	Transcription error / name correction
188:5	Hadla [ph]	Hadlaq	Name correction

Page and Line ref (Page:Line)	Current text	Revised text	Reason(s)
189:8-9	not like appointment	not a light appointment	Transcription error
191:4	that book at the time of the Majed has come	that book went out, 'The Time of the Majus Has Come'	Correction of title / Transcription error
191:5	And Ibn buys	And Ibn Baz buys	Name correction / Transcription error
206:13	I viewed those words	I used those words	Transcription error
241:4-5	in southern Asia	in South Asia	Transcription error
251:22	within the Minister	within the Ministry	Transcription error
312:8-9	these people have known dagar [ph]	these people have <i>noms de guerre</i>	Transcription error
352:10-11, 12, 18	irhaba [ph]	hiraba	Transcription errors
353:18, 19, 20	irhaba	hiraba	Transcription errors
355:4	Sahir	Sahih	Transcription error
355:5	source attributable hadiths	source of hadiths attributable	Transcription error
357:5	Sahir	Sahih	Transcription error

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed: August 18, 2022


EMILE A. NAKHLEH, Ph.D.